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Abstract 
 Foreign expansionary strategies are a common topic of research, as are studies on 
the strategies used by specific companies that have entered foreign markets. These 
studies of strategies often focus on the antecedents that lead to the internationalization 
process, in regards to a company’s expansionary strategy as a whole. Also, the studies on 
specific companies are just that, specific; they often do not include research on other 
companies’ expansions, which would allow comparative analysis to take place. Lastly 
these studies primarily analyze failed expansions. This research aims to fill those gaps in 
the present literature by analyzing specific expansionary strategies of multiple retail firms 
that have led to either successful or failed expansions in various countries around the 
world. 
 This study was accomplished by gathering and analyzing data on three retail 
companies, domiciled in two separate countries, and expansions into three different 
countries, in order to compare and contrast various expansions. In order to better analyze 
the expansions of these companies, an internationalization model has been constructed 
based on a collection of past literature. Through the application of this new model to the 
respective cases, the study will provide insight and information on international 
expansionary strategies and help retailers to learn from past successful or failed attempts 
through in-depth analysis of specific expansions 
 
Introduction 
 As the world has become a global marketplace, countless companies have 
1attempted to expand their operations into different countries. These large-scale 
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expansions have become commonplace across all industries and have been especially 
prevalent within the retail industry. With access to literally billions of new customers, 
retail companies have been aggressively attempting to grow their brands by establishing 
international operations. Upon entering foreign markets, expanding companies are often 
met with a number of various difficulties when trying to establish a foothold in the 
market, and, in an attempt to mitigate these problems, companies strive to develop 
expansionary strategies that will lead to successful entry. While some companies have 
found a recipe for successful expansion, many have failed to do so and oftentimes even 
the successful strategies can lead to failed expansions if used in a different market. There 
are numerous expansionary strategies that are used in an attempt to gain a presence in 
various international markets.  These strategies can differ depending on a multitude of 
reasons, including the companies’ country of origin, the country to which it is expanding, 
the particular industry, managerial practices, cultural differences, and many others. While 
the levels of success or failure often differ on a case-by-case basis, by examining the 
particular expansionary strategies, the key variances between successful and failed 
expansions are often evident. 
 Through the use of a model that depicts the various factors of the retail 
internationalization process, this study analyzes selected retail firms’ expansionary 
attempts by applying the factors and variables within the model to the specific 
companies. These past expansions, which span across the retail industry, as well as 
various countries and cultures, provide evidence on companies that have either succeeded 
or failed as a result of recognizing or ignoring the variables that lead to proper 
expansionary strategies. 
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Research Question 
 What strategies do retail companies utilize when expanding internationally and 
what factors cause those companies to either succeed or fail in foreign markets?  
Literature Review 
 This study has three objectives; identify and provide research on strategic 
variables that affect the internationalization process, provide analysis on a number various 
retail companies and their individual cases of expansion, and finally to produce an in-
depth look into the retail industry’s trend of international expansion. The literature that I 
have collected can be categorized into two areas of research. The first is comprised of 
studies on the retail industry as a whole, including a variety of expansionary strategies 
used by companies, as well as research on the independent variables that affect the 
outcome of the expansion, such as consumer receptiveness, psychic distance, and entry 
decisions. The second area of literature contains individual case studies on retail firms 
that have expanded internationally. These studies give an in-depth account of the various 
companies’ failures or successes. With this literature I will be able to expand on the cases 
and provide a study on international expansions within the retail industry by applying the 
collective literature to a model of the retail internationalization process. 
 For the first area of research, the retail industry and expansionary strategies, the 
studies that I am focusing on are “Consumer receptiveness to international retail 
expansion: a cross-cultural study of perceptions of social and economic influence of 
foreign retailers” by Molly Eckman, Sema Sakarya, Karen Hyllegard, Miguel Angel 
Gomez Borja, and Alejandro Molla Descals, published in 2015 and "The Relationship 
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Between Timing Of Entry Into A Foreign Market, Entry Mode Decision And Market 
Selection" published by M. Angeles Gallego, Encarnación Ramos Hidalgo, Francisco J. 
Acedo, José C. Casillas and Ana M. Moreno in 2009. 
 Eckman et al. set out to dig deeply into the variables that affected consumer 
receptiveness and focus on “socio- cultural and economic development across three 
countries with diverse cultures and varying degrees of socio-economic development: 
Spain, Turkey, and the USA (261).” In the past, consumer receptiveness was not a high 
priority for researchers when studying market selection and expansion, but this study 
sought to build upon prior research that argued that the measurement of consumer 
receptiveness was instrumental in analyzing the potential risk factors associated with 
foreign expansion. By researching expansion practices and how they are received in three 
different countries, Eckman at al. were able to obtain two levels of observations; the first 
being practices that are necessary industry wide, such as strategically analyzing the speed 
and size of the expansion, and the second being the country specific factors of the three 
countries, such as differing demographics, economic climates, and the general perception 
of American retailers held by the people of the foreign market. 
 The study done by M. Angeles Gallego et al., “The Relationship Between Timing 
Of Entry Into A Foreign Market, Entry Mode Decision And Market Selection,” provides 
a different angle on the analysis of retail internationalization. While Eckman et al. 
focused specifically on the consumers’ side of the market entry, Gallego at el. takes a 
step back and analyzes the importance of the market entry strategy as whole. The study is 
prefaced by recognizing three basic questions; “Where to internationalize? How to 
internationalize? and when? (307)” Typically, the ‘timing of entry’ was simply the time 
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from the founding of a company until the onset of their international ventures. This 
understanding provided no relation between the timing of entry and the respective mode 
and market selections. This study suggests that the three factors are in fact heavily related 
and that there is one factor in particular that links them together: risk.  
 The study states an assumption that “The company decides to internationalize at a 
point in time (timing of entry) when it considers it can assume such a risk; but from then 
on, all decisions that it has to take are geared towards the same goal, so it will take the 
decision that requires the least risk (312).” By framing the study around this belief, the 
researchers formed an integrative model to display this distinct relationship between 
timing, mode, and market. This model can be used to analyze past internationalization by 
firms, as I will be doing in my study, as well as providing future firms a framework for 
their international expansionary strategies. The researchers also mention that while they 
believe this model can be used for most firms with normal parameters and variables, they 
also “believe that this knowledge will help to prove that firms that do not follow this 
behavior model (born-globals, for example), can do so because one or more indirect 
variables have had such a strong influence that they minimized risk in general, altering 
the process and placing the firm at the same level as those that have followed the 
proposed model (323).” This mention of “born-globals” refers to very young companies 
that have rapidly expanded (6 years or less) into international markets. These companies 
are of high interest when looking at time of entry, as they are prone to rushing in and 
overlooking key risks in their expansionary strategies. 
 Through the research and analysis on the studies discussed above, as well as a 
number of supplemental studies regarding the retail industry and various expansionary 
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strategies, I have obtained a significant amount of resources that will be used for the 
second area of my research. This research will be a multi-case study, consisting of 
various retailers from around the world that have expanded internationally. While there 
has been extensive literature on international expansion, the majority of the studies have 
limited their scopes to a single domestic country, a single company, or a focus on either 
successful or failed expansions. To expand on these studies, my research will analyze 
U.S. retail companies that have expanded internationally, foreign companies that have 
expanded into the U.S., as well as foreign companies that have expanded to countries 
other than the U.S. The literature on these individual cases will provide the information 
needed for the last section of my study, which is completing a multi-case analysis, not 
only on the various countries of origin and entry, but also on the factors present in the 
companies’ strategies that caused them to either fail or succeed.  
  This multi-case analysis will be conducted by using the loose structure of a 
model of the retail internationalization process developed by Irena Vida and Ann 
Fairhurst in their study entitled “International Expansion of Retail Firms: A Theoretical 
Approach For Future Investigations.” Through the adaptation and use of this model I will 
be able to identify critical independent variables that are prevalent in the expansionary 
strategies used and, by doing so, analyze why the various companies failed in their 
respective international expansion attempts. Overall, it will be the ability to apply this 
model to the companies’ cases that will provide this study with beneficial results, as well 
as build on past research, and ultimately have the potential to be used in the future to aid 
in the expansionary strategies adopted by international firms.   
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Retail Internationalization Model 
 As noted above, this model was created by Irena Vida and Ann Fairhurst in their 
study entitled “International Expansion of Retail Firms: A Theoretical Approach For 
Future Investigations.” This study was created in an attempt to serve two purposes, the 
first being to analyze the existing literature at the time, in regards to a behavioral 
paradigm, and the second being to create a “descriptive model which could serve as a 
basis for future empirical investigations of international retail expansion and provide a 
better understanding of the complexity of the process” (Vida 149). This descriptive 
model can be seen below. 
 
 Their research and respective model focus initially on the antecedents of the 
internationalization process such as the “Decision-Maker” (managerial) characteristics, as 
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well as firm characteristics as a whole, and also include various external characteristics 
that may have an effect on a company or executive. These antecedents then act as either 
promotors or inhibitors to a firm in regards to making the decision of whether or not to 
expand internationally. Thus far, the components of the model, while insightful into the 
retail internationalization process, are focused on the factors leading up to the key 
components of an expansion, entry mode and market selection, which are labeled as 
outcomes. As a result, in the adaptation of this model, I focus my analysis of the various 
cases on the actual act of expanding, rather than the individual characteristics that lead to 
the decision of internationalizing. This will allow me to more appropriately analyze the 
various cases. 
Expansionary Variables 
 In order to adequately analyze the various cases, it is important to have a solid 
understanding of the research behind the varying factors that lead to the successful or 
failed outcomes of the companies expansions. The main factors considered in this study 
are timing of entry, market selection, entry mode, and consumer receptiveness. 
Timing of Entry 
 In the context of internationalization, timing of entry relates to two different 
aspects of expansion, the first being the “stage of the life cycle of the particular industry 
in which it finds itself “ (Gallego 316), and the second being the speed of a firms’ 
expansionary process. Although this additional analysis on the timing of entry, as a 
complement to market selection and entry mode, is not always incorporated into research, 
George and Jones (2000) argue that it can and should play a much more significant role 
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because it “directly impacts the what, how, and why” and “must be explicitly included in 
any theory” (George 658). 
 Much of the literature surrounding the internationalization process attributes one 
factor to be at the heart of every decision; the amount of risk associated with the decision. 
This directly leads into the concept of timing of entry. According to Gallego et al. (2009), 
the timing of entry is the moment that a firm decides to expand internationally, as a result 
of believing it can assume the risk of the expansion. Then, as the firm progresses through 
the internationalization process, the speed at which it expands is related to the 
minimization of risks associated with international operations.  This expansionary speed 
is most commonly separated into two broad distinctions, fast (earlier) and slow (later) 
expansions. This general separation of speed provides the basis for a model created by 
Gallego et al. that expresses the relationship that timing of entry has with both market 
selection and entry mode. (Appendix 1)  
 Through the identification of the five variables that most affect the amount of a 
firm’s internationalization risk, the model can form a framework to provide analysis on 
individual cases. These five risk-related variables are knowledge, resources, product & 
process innovation tendency, mimicry, and situational uncertainty. The application of 
these variables expresses the amount of risk associated with an expansion, which in turn, 
contributes to the decision of early vs. later expansions. According to Gallego et al., 
earlier timing of entry tends to result in firms’ market selection and entry mode being 
more conservative, while later timing of entry allows firms more time to gather more 
information and thus choose a less conservative markets to enter and modes in which to 
do so. 
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Market Selection 
 When looking at the internationalization of retail firms, the three main elements 
of market selection as identified by Burt (1993), are cultural proximity, geographical 
proximity, and retail market development. Years later, Alexander et al. (2007), expanded 
upon these three elements and were able to identify trends within international expansion. 
It was found that retailers tend to expand from larger domestic markets to smaller and 
less developed foreign markets. This is often a result of a saturation of competition within 
the established markets and inversely, a less competitive foreign market. In addition to 
market size and development, “cultural proximity” as identified by Burt, is one of the 
most important determinants of market selection. Cultural differences between the firm’s 
home country and the potential host country can result in major misconceptions and 
miscommunications related to expansions. This idea of separation between the two 
markets is known as “psychic distance.” 
 Psychic distance can be defined in many ways, but the central idea remains the 
same. One definition is, “the sum of factors preventing the flow of information from and 
to the market” (Johanson 24), and another being “the distance between the (firm’s) home 
market and a foreign market, resulting from the perception of both cultural and business 
differences” (Azar 584-585). While cultural distance is applied to broad cultures as a 
whole, this concept of psychic distance is often reserved for the assessments on the views 
of managers within a specific firm. Key aspects of this distance between cultures are 
differences in language, business practices and cultural norms. These differences often 
represent a barrier to the possibility of expansion to a particular country.  
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 In spite of this apparent barrier to expansion across differing cultures, Azar et al. 
(2014) identify a paradox within the research of psychic distance. It is a general belief 
that firms will perform better in markets that similar to their own, but in some cases, this 
“perceived familiarity (with a foreign market) can lead to carelessness and failure” 
(O’Grady 329). In contrast to this, if a firm is planning on operating in a physically or 
culturally distant country, the management will go to greater lengths to ensure an 
appropriate expansionary strategy. 
Entry Mode 
 Upon deciding to expand internationally and selecting a foreign market in which 
to do so, a firm’s management must determine an appropriate entry mode by which they 
want to structure their foreign operations. The three most common choices are a wholly 
owned subsidiary (acquisition or greenfield-investment), a joint venture, or a contractual 
entry mode (licensing or franchising). When analyzing these three strategic entry modes, 
Hill (1990) and Herrmann (2002) produced two very similar tables, which lay out a 
number of constructs that are usually associated with each entry mode’s level of control. 
Hill et al.’s table (Appendix 2) and Herrmann and Datta’s table (Appendix 3) show that 
with highly controlled, wholly owned entry modes, companies have a high resource 
commitment which involves “deployment of assets which cannot be easily redeployed 
without incurring substantial sunk costs [Hill et al., 1990]. Such assets constitute exit 
barriers limiting strategic flexibility and thereby increasing venture risks (Herrmann et 
al., 555). As shown in the tables, other risks involved with highly controlled entry modes 
include environment, political, and economic risks. In spite of these risks, having a highly 
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controlled entry mode enables a company to have lower dissemination risks, higher 
corporate knowledge of local markets, and ultimately higher returns. 
 One of the strategic variables within the entry mode decision is choosing between 
a ‘multi-domestic’ strategy and a ‘global’ strategy. A multi-domestic strategy is “based 
upon the belief that national markets differ widely with regard to consumer tastes and 
preferences, competitive conditions, operating conditions, and political, legal, and social 
structures” (Hill et al. 20). On the other hand, a global strategy “largely ignores national 
or regional differences. The global retailer expands to markets that have a segment of 
consumers that will view their product offering favorably. Global retailers’ adaptation to 
local market conditions is superficial (Park et al. 281). Relating these two strategies back 
to appendices 2 and 3, Hill et al. make two assumptions, with other things being equal, a 
multi-domestic strategy will prefer low-control entry modes and a global strategy will 
prefer high-control entry modes. 
Consumer Receptiveness 
 In the past, the majority of research has been completed on the actions and 
decisions involved in the internationalization process, such as those discussed above, 
timing of entry, market selection, and entry mode. While the majority of research has 
focused mainly on the first three factors, consumer receptiveness has become an 
increasingly common topic of research. In a study by Alexander et al. (2010), consumer 
receptiveness is identified as “the willingness of the individual or group to accept 
retailers based in other markets operating in the individual or group’s domestic market.” 
The reception of a firm stems from the characteristics of the firm itself, including the type 
of products that it offers, as well as the characteristics of the host country, including 
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social or economic factors. In the book “Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behavior: An 
Introduction to Theory and Research”, by Fishbein and Ajzen, a model was developed 
that broke down consumer receptiveness into four parts: beliefs, attitudes, knowledge, 
and behavior. It is the positive or negative levels of these four factors that often lead to 
the success or failure of a company’s expansion. As a result, it is the challenge of 
expanding firms to attempt to ensure positive levels of consumer receptiveness in 
potential markets, meanwhile attempting to mitigate the risk of the expansion. Ultimately, 
it is how consumers receive a foreign company, either initially and/or over time that leads 
to the success or failure of the venture. In order to develop a successful expansionary 
strategy, a firm must determine an appropriate timing of entry, market selection, and 
entry mode that will lead to the highest possible levels of consumer receptiveness. 
 
Model Adaptation 
 As stated above, in order to better analyze the various cases, the model 
constructed by Vida and Fairhurst will be adapted. To provide this additional analysis to 
the cases in my study, the factors of  “Timing of Entry” and “Consumer Receptiveness” 
will be added as key variables in the internationalization framework. While in the 
existing model, ‘market selection’ and ‘entry mode’ are within the “outcome” section of 
the expansion process, in the formation of this study, ‘Timing of Entry’ will be added in 
direct relationship to market selection and entry mode within the “process” section of the 
model; and consumer receptiveness will be included under “outcome.” 
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  Also, while these four factors will comprise the focus of the case analyses, the 
beginning and end of the model will remain the relatively the same; beginning with the 
external and internal environment affecting the expansion evaluation for a firm and 
ultimately ending with the performance of the international operations. 
 
  
 As expressed above, the environment in which a company finds itself, both 
internally and externally, affects the amount of risk a company is willing to take in order 
to increase the profits and scope of their business. It is this evaluation of risk, and 
assumed acceptance of the risk, which leads to the actual expansion. Once in the process 
of expanding, the three main variables have explicit effects on each other, as was 
explained in detail earlier. The success or failure of these strategic variables determines 
the level of consumer receptiveness, which in this model is not the ultimate outcome but 
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is in fact a prelude to the overall performance of the operation. This variable of consumer 
receptiveness can be viewed both as an independent and dependent variable, which is 
why it lies between the process and the final outcome. While it is often dependent on the 
success of the entry process variables, the host consumers occasionally do accept a 
retailer if initial problems are fixed through changes to the operations, which is present in 
the model in “Management Considerations.” Finally, at the end of the model is 
”Performance of International Retail Operations;” upon determining the overall 
performance, the executives then decide whether to remain in the market, often at varying 
degrees of growth or decline of operations, or to withdraw altogether.  
 It is this adaptation of the model and general analysis approach, that will structure 
the study in a way to provide insight on the various cases as well as clarity on the 
presence of the particular expansionary variables within the retail internationalization 
process. 
 
Application of Model to Cases 
 As described above, the application of this model to these particular cases begins 
not at the “Antecedents” of external environment, internal environment, or evaluation, 
but with the process portion of the model. As these are cases of past expansions, the 
firms’ management evaluated the risk of expanding internationally and chose to do so. 
 
 (A complete list of the companies, cases, and results can be seen in Appendix 4.) 
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Wal-Mart: Germany 
 In the mid-1990’s, Wal-Mart had grown to be, by far, the largest retailer in the 
U.S., in addition to having locations within Canada and Mexico, as well as in South 
America. This clear and dominant hold on the retail industry within the U.S. led to their 
timing of entry into these foreign markets, and in this particular case, Germany in 1997. 
Wal-Mart had established itself within the market, and as such, to satisfy the first 
definition of timing of entry, decided upon a moment to expand internationally, resulting 
from the belief that it could assume the risk of the expansion (Gallego). Upon making the 
decision to expand into Europe, the German market was a clear choice for two reasons. 
The first being that Germany was “the third largest retail market in the world (after the 
USA and Japan) and accounted for fully 15% of Europe’s approximately $2 trillion-a-
year retail market” (Christopherson 459). The second reason for selecting the German 
market was that it opened up opportunities for Wal-Mart to expand to Eastern European 
Markets. 
 When looking at the second facet of ‘Timing of Entry’, which is the speed of a 
firm’s expansion process, in relation to ‘Market Selection’, it is clear that these two 
factors played pivotal roles in Wal-Mart’s expansion. Realizing that they entered 
Germany at a time when the retail market was especially saturated, management decided 
to incorporate a fast (or early) strategy of entry. This fast strategy was an attempt to 
quickly incorporate the company’s “Every Day Low Prices” model in order to “change 
German consumers’ preferences in favor of the one stop shop concept, and thus act as a 
‘market spoiler’” (Pioch 209). The use of this rapid strategy into a saturated German 
market displayed a certain level of arrogance among the Wal-Mart executives, who held a 
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belief that the company could use similar strategic decisions in Germany as it had done 
successfully in the U.S. This arrogance was further displayed in the resulting choice of 
‘Entry Mode’. 
 Wal-Mart entered the German market in 1997 through the acquisition of wholly 
owned subsidiaries, specifically with the purchase of 21 existing Wertkauf stores, as well 
as 74 Interspar hypermarkets in 1998. While this entry mode has proven to be a preferred 
method within Wal-Mart’s expansionary strategy, in this particular case, the selection of 
the German market resulted in few options of existing stores to take over. “Because the 
leading food chains in Germany are privately held, there were no opportunities for hostile 
takeovers as there would be in the Anglo-American markets. In order to enter the market 
Wal-Mart was forced to purchase the two relatively weak chains, Interspar and 
Wertkauf” (Christopherson 459). While the acquisition of these two chains gave Wal-
Mart an entry into the market, it represented only a 3% share of the German retail market 
sector, placing them 11th in overall retail sales. However, according to Christopherson 
(2007) the German grocery sector of the retail market is concentrated within the top 5 
companies, which account for almost 80% of all sales. Ultimately, providing Wal-Mart 
with a rather weak position to begin their operations within Germany. 
 Compounding on the issue of having a very small foothold in the German market, 
Wal-Mart was poorly received by the German retail consumer base almost immediately, 
for a number of reasons. For instance, many of the locations that had been purchased 
were outside of the popular city centers. This caused two problems, the first being that 
German retailers are typically within neighborhood locations and in small stores, and the 
second issue being that many Germans use public transportation and it was inconvenient 
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for them to have to drive to the new, remote Wal-Mart locations. In order to fight these 
problems, Wal-Mart aimed to use its primary competitive strategy, undercutting prices, in 
an attempt to overcome its “lack of and embedded network or neighborhood retail 
establishments and to weaken competitors so the could be acquired” (Christopherson 
460). Unfortunately for Wal-Mart, they failed to recognize the price competitive retail 
market that was already in place in Germany. The typical German retail customers, 
especially grocery shoppers, were accustomed to having the ability to compare prices 
across multiple stores. As a result, the idea of traveling outside of their neighborhoods to 
do all of their shopping at Wal-Mart, which didn’t even guarantee them the lowest 
possible price, was very unappealing to the German consumer. Again, this shows the 
apparent ignorance that Wal-Mart’s management showed upon entering the market. 
 Another area in which Wal-Mart failed to obtain a true understanding on the 
German market was in the handling of their customers and employees. While in the U.S. 
it is very common for customers to be greeted in a store by a smile or a wave from a 
waiting employee or at the checkout counter, this is not the normal practice in German 
retailers. In spite of this, Wal-Mart expected this same demeanor in its German stores. 
They did not consider that in Germany, many people felt very uncomfortable being 
greeted by someone that they did not know.  
 Also, Wal-Mart is used to a high level of firm autonomy, and as a result failed to 
realize the importance of correctly approaching collective bargaining agreements among 
their employees. While the workers were paid 3% above the collectively bargained scale, 
the company refused to adopt German collective agreements (Gewerkschaft 2000). This 
refusal to follow the normal customs led to dissention within the employees, and by 
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association, dissention within the consumers. The dispute rose to such high levels that in 
July of 2000, workers picketed the stores to force the company to join the employers’ 
association and abide by collective agreements (Christopherson 2007). This separation of 
business practices and the backlash from the employees and consumers, led to the 
creation of the unfavorable image of Wal-Mart in Germany, as well as the “erosion of the 
potential German middle class customer base” (461). 
 While there were significant managerial considerations in attempts to fix the 
continuously growing problem of trying to capture the German consumer base, these 
were outweighed by the pressure applied by the Wal-Mart shareholders who began to 
lose patience that this expansion would turn a profit. They were also discouraged by the 
continuous aggressive stance displayed by the consumers and competitors. The 
shareholders believed that the company should look for other areas of Europe to invest its 
resources, such as the U.K. Ultimately, these factors led to Wal-Mart’s final withdrawal 
from the German market in 2006, after amassing over $1 billion in losses, they sold all 85 
German stores to the German retailer Metro AG (Yoder 2016). 
 This analysis proposes that main cause of Wal-Mart’s failure in Germany was 
two-fold: the failure to obtain advantageous locations within the German market, which 
prevented Wal-Mart from competing in the comparison shopping atmosphere that was 
present in the country, as well as the company’s inability to develop a sufficient business 
model that is correctly modified in order to best suit the German retail consumers. 
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Wal-Mart: Canada 
 Prior to Wal-Mart’s failed expansion into Germany, it opened operations in 
Canada. Leading up to this northern expansion, Wal-Mart had established itself as the 
United States’ top retailer and had also entered into the Mexican retail market through a 
joint venture with the country’s largest retailer, Cifra (Govindajaran 2002). With the 
company being at the top of the U.S. market and looking to expand upon its international 
operations, Wal-Mart used a fast timing of entry to enter the Canadian market in 1994. 
While the company began operations in Canada in ’94, the foundation for this fast timing 
of entry, as well as the company’s strategy for market selection and entry mode began to 
form in 1982. 
 In 1982, the American-based retailer Woolco closed down its 336 U.S. stores, 
selling a majority of them to Wal-Mart (Press-Courier 1982). Twelve years later, Wal-
Mart again acquired Woolco stores, this time being 122 stores in Canada (Heller 2015). 
This selection of the Canadian market was perfect for Wal-Mart’s desires to continue its 
expansionary plans. In addition to the similarities in income and cultural between the 
United State and Canada, Wal-Mart was also the first big-box retailer to expand into the 
country. Also, in contrast to the company’s joint venture in Mexico, the entry mode of 
wholly owned discount retailers through acquisition was the logical decision. Canada is a 
mature market, so the entry through greenfield investment would only increase the level 
of competition. Also, with the company’s familiarity of the Canadian market, a joint 
venture was unnecessary.  
 Throughout the entirety of Wal-Mart’s operations in Canada, they have achieved 
tremendously positive consumer receptiveness. The business model of “everyday low 
 23 
prices” attracted and retained customers, and the convenient locations of the stores 
allowed easy marketability of the Wal-Mart brand. This success has allowed the company 
to have tremendous growth within the country. In 2006, they successfully launched their 
supercenter store format. As of February 2016 Wal-Mart has 404 total stores, including 
316 supercenters and 88 discount stores, and is Canada’s fastest growing retailer (Wal-
Mart/Canada). 
  
Target: Canada 
 In 2011, after experiencing years of tremendous success in the United States, 
Target announced its first international expansion into Canada. The expansionary 
strategies utilized by the company were quite similar to Wal-Mart’s expansion into 
Germany, and as a result ended with a similar, although much more swift, failure of 
operations. Targets timing of entry was at a point in their lifecycle where they had grown 
to be the second-largest discount retailer in the United States, following only Wal-Mart. 
This success in the U.S. led them to assume to risk of opening their first international 
operation. It also led them to believe they could quickly enter the market, adopting an 
early timing of entry.  
 While there are some minor differences between the U.S. and Canadian markets, 
American retailers, as well as companies in other industries, often select Canada as one of 
their first international locations because of the many similarities between the consumer 
bases. Companies such as Wal-Mart and Costco had experienced success in the Canadian 
market, and Target believed that it could do the same. Unfortunately for Target, the 
formation of their troubles seemed to start before they even opened their first store. 
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“Timing of entry” as mentioned before, consists of both the timing of a company’s 
decision to enter a market as well as the speed by which they do so. Typically, if a 
company is planning on adapting an early, or fast, approach of timing of entry, there is 
little time differential between the announcement of internationalization and the actual 
opening of operations. For Target Canada, this was not the case. Target announced its 
plan for expansion into Canada in 2011, but did not open its stores until 2013. This lead-
time of two years gave the pre-existing retailers an opportunity to improve their 
businesses or expand to better fend against the introduction of Target into the market. As 
a result, “retail competition in Canada was fierce when Target opened in the spring of 
2013, much tougher than Target executives had initially expected it to be, they later 
admitted” (Shaw 2015).  
 Additionally, the speed (or timing) of Target’s entry mode led to major problems 
in their supply-chain operations. Target entered the market through the mode of wholly 
owned subsidiaries, by the acquisition of 133 pre-existing stores from the Canadian 
department store chain, Zellers (Yoder 2016). In 2013, they opened an unprecedented 
124 of the 133 stores, as well as 3 distribution centers within the first 10 months. This 
extremely accelerated expansion proved too much for the company to handle in its first 
international experience, and it led to disastrous supply chain issues (Megits 2015). After 
consumers eagerly awaited the opening of the new U.S. based store, they soon found 
many of the locations to be completely under stocked after the initial demand present, or 
even on the opening day of operations. This lack of available products would continue to 
haunt Target through the entirety of its Canadian operations. At various locations, shelves 
were cleared so quickly that the employees attempted to place action figures or dolls 
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throughout multiple racks to make the aisles look fuller. In one store the inventory levels, 
and subsequent display of products got so bad that one manager instructed employees to 
fill half of an entire aisle with Tide detergent in order to fill the empty space (Banjo 
2014). 
 Returning to Target’s entry mode, while the purchase of stores in a foreign market 
is a typical cost-saving strategy used by international companies, it turned out that the 
Zellers stores “required extensive expansion and refurbishing, which turned out to be 
more costly them Target originally anticipated” (Yoder 2016). The locations of these 
stores are also responsible for some of the problems within the supply chain. According 
to Megits (2015), multiple stores were over 1,600 km’s away from a distribution center, 
which in comparison would be equivalent to supplying a store in Seattle from a 
distribution center located in Minneapolis. 
 Lastly, a major problem that Target faced was the failure of their pricing strategy 
in Canada compared to their American locations. As Tony Fisher, the president of Target 
Canada, said, “We built our business model to be incredibly competitive with the lowest-
priced leaders in Canada. We’re not building our business model as compared to the 
U.S.” (Target Canada 2013).  This pricing strategy caused confusion within the consumer 
base, which had grown familiar with Target’s low pricing model by shopping in the 
various locations across the border in the United States. The customers realized that, as a 
result of this price disparity, they could simply go to other big chain retailers to get a 
better value on everyday products. In the end, Target’s management, even when looking 
at best-case scenarios, couldn’t predict making a profit in Canada until 2021. As a result, 
they decided to completely pull out of Canada in January 2015. After only two years of 
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operations, the company amassed losses of over $2 billion, with a $5.4 billion write-down 
in total (Peterson 2015).  
 While Target’s selection of the decently saturated Canadian market presented the 
company with some problems, its failure was due mainly to the issues created by the 
speed of their entry into the market as well as their inability to attract a loyal consumer 
base. The insurmountable difficulties within their supply chain, compounded by the 
complete misunderstanding of consumers expectations caused Target Canada to become 
one of the fastest and most significant examples of a retailers’ failure to expand 
internationally. 
  
Tesco: U.S.A. 
 Prior to the British grocery retailer’s expansion into the U.S., Tesco had 
experienced tremendous success, both at home and in international markets. The 
company has dominated the U.K. market and as of 2015 held an industry leading market 
share of 29.4%, compared to the next best being only 17.1% (Butler 2015). It also has 
over 7,500 stores worldwide in 12 countries (Yoder 2016). To expand on this well-
established multinational success, the company announced in 2007 that it would be 
expanding into the U.S. market through ‘Fresh and Easy’ stores.  
 The company’s timing of entry came at a time when they had built a strong home 
base as well as possessed significant knowledge of expanding internationally. With this 
background to build off of, they chose expand quickly by opening 199 stores throughout 
2007 (Pfeifer 2013). These stores were located on the west coast of the U.S., which 
presented the company with a number of problems. In contrast to the U.S.’s east coast’s 
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tendency to have high population density (similar to U.K. cities), the west coast tends to 
be more spread out in regards to population. This causes consumers to drive to grocery 
stores, and as a result gives consumers more simplicity to bigger retailers to buy large 
quantities. Tesco’s style built around frequent shopping may have been more effective 
within big cities in the east, where more pedestrian traffic leads to easier everyday 
shopping. Another problem that arose from their market selection was the decision to set 
up many locations near newly developed housing developments as well as lower-income 
neighborhoods. Unfortunately for Tesco, their expansion into the U.S. market in ’07 was 
followed by financial disaster in 2008 when the subprime mortgage crisis and subsequent 
recession hit the U.S. economy. These effects of the recession caused the devastation of 
the neighborhoods surrounding many Tesco locations (Sonne & Evans 2012). 
 In addition to the problems caused by the timing and locations of Tesco’s entry, 
their entry mode had negative effects as well. The company chose to expand into the U.S. 
by wholly owned subsidiaries through greenfield investments. They quickly built the 199 
stores as well as multiple distribution centers from the ground up. In doing so, they were 
making an “unprecedented bid to establish both a store network and a proprietary 
distribution system at the same time” (Birchall 2006). This decision would prove to be 
troublesome as the size and styles of the stores were often unfamiliar and unpleasant to 
the U.S. consumers.  In hindsight, initial entry by joint ventures may have allowed them 
to benefit from the knowledge of local retailers and could have potentially prevented a 
number of the problems they experienced in reaching consumers. 
 While Tesco was trying to introduce a more novel grocery store than the typical 
U.S. grocer, they failed to identify a number of small but key characteristics of their new 
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consumer base. Among these mistakes was the lack of coupons, which consumers in the 
U.S. use constantly in order to get the best deal, whereas in Britain, “money-off coupons 
are often seen as signs of desperation” (Bateson 2012). Similar to the lack of coupons, the 
new Tesco stores did not incorporate “loyalty cards” until the last year of operations. 
These cards are another way U.S. retailers create value and loyalty within their consumer 
bases, and Tesco failed to identify this. In addition to the lack of these value-creating 
devices, Tesco also incorporate the U.K. style of self-service checkouts. The American 
shoppers typically prefer face-to-face interaction, as this provides them with the value of 
better sense of customer service, instead of the simplicity of self-checkout (Yoder 2016). 
Lastly, Tesco chose to stock its stores with mainly Fresh and Easy products, ignoring the 
fact that U.S. grocery shoppers are very brand-conscious and would instead travel to 
stores where they were provided with more options. 
 Ultimately after 6 years of poor financial performance, the company announced in 
2013 that it would be withdrawing from the U.S. with an overall loss of £1.2 billion, or 
$1.6 billion (Morris 2013). In retrospect, an operation that should have been another 
successful international expansion for Tesco turned into one of the company’s largest 
failures.  
 With the company’s expansion into the U.S. coming the year before the financial 
recession, it is possible that they could have found success if they had simply entered the 
market 5 years prior. In spite of this extremely unfortunate timing, the inadequate 
understanding of the American consumers’ expectations was a critical error. 
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Conclusion 
 With the potential to add billions of new consumers as well as billions of dollars 
in additional revenue, internationalization can provide a company with a chance to 
drastically expand the scope of its business. While there is plenty of potential upside 
when companies expand internationally, it comes with major risks of failure as well. In 
order to mitigate the risks involved, it is critical that companies incorporate well-formed 
expansionary strategies that are appropriate for a particular market. If an expanding 
company failed to so do, the results could be extremely negative effects on a company’s 
financials as well as their overall operations, as witnessed by the failures of Wal-Mart, 
Target, and Tesco. These companies, in spite of having extremely successful operations 
elsewhere, displayed that even the most powerful firms can fail to expand internationally 
if they approach the process with an arrogance in their operations or a failure to properly 
research the foreign market when attempting to devise a successful strategy. In contrast, 
as witnessed by Wal-Mart’s expansion into Canada, a company can excel in their 
expansionary strategy in one country while later failing in another, for a multitude of 
reasons. Also, similar companies can utilize similar strategies into a certain country, but 
any number of things can go overlooked within the strategies, and ultimately cause the 
failure of one and success of the other. One thing is clear, there are many ways to develop 
successful strategies of expanding internationally, but in order to do so, companies must 
accurately access the risks associated with expanding and truly understand the foreign 
market in which they are investing. 
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Future Research 
 Upon the conclusion that the proposed model in this study does in fact produce 
meaningful analysis of international expansions, further research on this paper can be 
accomplished in two areas. The first would be to use the existing model on other cases of 
internationalization. After seeing the results gathered in this study, the application of the 
model to additional past cases can provide insight and analysis on failed or successful 
internationalization attempts. The second area of further research would be the continued 
development and adaptation of the internationalization model. This could be 
accomplished either through the addition or subtraction of expansionary variables or 
through the creation of a new model based on the current one. If beneficial adjustments 
are made, more valuable research can be done on future cases.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1. Gallego et al.: Timing of Entry Framework 
 
 
Appendix 2. Hill et al.  
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Appendix 3. Herrmann and Datta 
 
 
Appendix 4.  
Company Domicile Expansion Result 
Wal-Mart U.S. Germany Failure 
Canada Success 
Target U.S. Canada Failure 
Tesco U.K. U.S. Failure 
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